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Article 1

EQUAL PROTECTION, SOCIAL WELFARE LITIGATION,
THE BURGER COURT
Mark S. Coven*
Robert 1. Fersh**
Opinions such as those in Reed and James seemed drawn more
as efforts to shield rather than to reveal the true basis of the Court's
decisions.-Justice Marshall dissenting in San Antonio School
District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 110 (1973).
I. Introduction
In 1905 the Supreme Court held that a New York labor law which prohibited employment in bakeries for more than 60 hours a week or more than 10
hours a day violated the fourteenth amendment of the federal Constitution.'
Justice Holmes, in dissent, wrote:
The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social
Statics... [A] constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic
theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the
State or of laissez faire. It is made for people of fundamentally differing
views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar
or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the
question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of
the United States.2
In subsequent years the Court rejected the approach that the fourteenth amendment due process clause contained a separate substantive content. The Court
returned to its previous position' that states have power to legislate against practices injurious to their internal economic affairs, so long as these laws do not
violate a specific federal constitutional prohibition. 4 In regard to the substantive
content of the fourteenth amendment, the Court has concluded,
"Whether wisdom or unwisdom resides in the scheme of benefits ... is not
for us to say. The answer to such inquiries must come from Congress, not
the courts. Our concern here, as often, is with power, not with wisdom." 5
This statement signalled the demise of substantive due process. Recent developments in equal protection cases, however, resurrect the issue of whether the
* Clerk for the Hon. William Grimes, Supreme Court of New Hampshire; J.D., Boston
University, 1975; B.A., Union College, 1972.
**
Staff Associate, Government Affairs and Social Policy, American Public Welfare
Association, Washington, D.C.; J.D., Boston University, 1975; B.S., Cornell University, 1972.
The authors are indebted to Ira C. Lupu, Associate Professor of Law, Boston University
School of Law, for his editorial assistance, for his insights in the area of equal protection, and
for his encouragement and direction.
1 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
2 Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
3 See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
4 Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
5 Halvering v. Lewis, 301 U.S. 619, 644 (1937).
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fourteenth amendment contains any substantive content, and whether the equal
protection clause has been utilized to achieve the same purposes as the discredited
substantive due process approach. This article initially examines the various
standards that have been utilized by the Supreme Court in its equal protection
analysis and examine others which have been suggested for its use. The article
then suggests a new model for equal protection, referred to as the "unitary
approach" to equal protection. The "unitary approach" is recommended as a
means of employing all relevant considerations in future equal protection analyses.
The "unitary approach" is suggested not only to aid the Supreme Court in
articulating a principled equal protection standard, but also to those attorneys
and legal scholars who raise equal protection challenges to social welfare legislation. It is the thesis of this article that an equal protection attack is not foreclosed in the area of social welfare legislation, and the article will examine recent
Supreme Court social welfare cases as a vehicle to explain the application of
this evolving equal protection standard. It will further analyze the use of the
"unitary approach" as it may be applied to recent welfare cases, so as to suggest
a viable approach which combines all relevant equal protection considerations in
social welfare cases.
II. The Standards
A. The Warren Court
The Warren Court developed a two-tier approach to the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court used the traditional minimal
scrutiny required by the equal protection clause in reviewing most classifications.
Under this restrained standard of review, statutes are presumed valid, and as long
as the means are reasonably related to a legitimate purpose, the legislation will
be upheld." If the challenged classification has some "reasonable basis," it does
not violate the Constitution simply because it "is not made with mathematical
nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality."' The classification
will be upheld if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.'
Minimal rationality review allows the Court to follow the policy set by the
legislature and often requires the Court to determine which of several possible
legislative purposes is the most probable.10 The Court, in maintaining the delicate
balance between its role and that of the legislature, has often attributed the pur-

6
7
8
9
10

See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
In equal protection cases.., a court is not faced with a problem of applying a statute
consistently with the overall policy established by the legislature; instead the concern
is to assess the constitutional validity of a statute whose coverage is usually not at
issue.
Note, Developments In The Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. Rv.1065, 1077 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Developments].
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pose thought to be most probable to the challenged classification."1 The Court
has exercised considerable imagination in attributing conceivable purposes to
legislative classifications.' Unless blatantly arbitrary or capricious, the classification will be upheld, and if any state of facts which would sustain the classification's rationality can be reasonably conceived, the existence of such facts must
be assumed. Both overinclusion and underinclusion are tolerated in the classification-the former because "mathematical nicety is not required," the latter
because the legislature is free to remedy part of an evil, and to act where it
believes the harm is the most acute.' s
The second tier of the Warren Court approach involves a more active
review.
".... [I]n cases involving 'suspect classifications' or touching on 'fundamental
interests,' ... the court has adapted an attitude of active and critical analysis,
subjecting the classification to strict scrutiny.... Under the strict standard
applied in such cases, the state bears the burden of establishing not only that
it has a compelling interest which justifies the law, but 4that the distinctions
drawn by the law are necessary to further the purpose.""

The Warren Court interpreted the Constitution as requiring that certain classifications, such as those based on race,'- lineage, 6 and alienage, 7 be deemed suspect. These classifications are subjected to the most rigid scrutiny and require
that the classifications bear more than a merely rational connection with a legitimate public purpose. 8 A very heavy burden of justification is demanded of the
state which draws the distinction, because a suspect classification is valid only if
11 See Royster Guana Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920). In fact, at times the Court
has even gone as far as to attribute to the legislation:
[a]ny reasonable conceivable purpose which would support the constitutionality of the
classification. Instead of asking, "what purpose or purposes do this statute and otfier
relevant materials in fact reflect?" the court may ask, "what constitutionally permissible objective might this statute and other relevant materials plausibly be construed
to reflect."
Developments, supra note 10, at 1078.
12 See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Kotch v. Pilot Comm'rs., 330 U.S. 552

(1947).

13 See Railway Express v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). Due to the separation of
powers inherent in the Constitution, the Court is ordinarily not free to substitute its judgment
for that of the legislature. The integrity of the legislature is guarded on the assumption that
political decisions should be enacted by the elected representative of the people, and the integrity of the legislature is not to be challenged by the Court. As justice Harlan noted in his
dissent in Shapiro v. Thompson:
Today's decision, it seems to me, reflects to an unusual degree the current notion that
this Court possesses a peculiar wisdom all its own whose capacity to lead this Nation
out of its present troubles is contained only by the limits of judicial ingenuity; in contriving new constitutional principles to meet each problem as it arises. . . . This
resurgence of the expansive view of equal protection carries the seeds of more judicial
interference with the state and federal legislative process, much more indeed than
does the judicial application of "due process" according to traditional concepts, ...
about which some members of the Court have expressed fears as to its potentialities
for setting us judges "at large."
394 U.S. 618, 677 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
14 Serrano v. Priest, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 609, 487 P.2d 1241, 1249, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 597
(1971) (italics in original).
15 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
16 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
17 Takahashi v. Fish Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
18 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
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necessary to achieve some overriding purpose. 9 The state must come forward
with a compelling interest to justify a suspect classification, and may have to show
that less drastic means do not exist to accomplish the same purpose.
Classifications based on race, alienage, or lineage are held to be immediately
suspect, subjected to the most rigid scrutiny, and require an overriding statutory
purpose. Exactly what causes a classification to be characterized as suspect has
never been fully explained by the Court, although a number of suggestions have
been posited. Suspect racial classifications may be explained by reference to the
historical basis of the fourteenth amendment." Suspect classifications may also
be explained by the characterization of discrete, insular minorities.2" If certain
groups are politically impotent, they have no voice in the political process and
no hopes of effecting the desired change through the legislative body. As a result,
when politically disadvantaged minorities are affected, the legislation is more
critically scrutinized.22 A further explanation is that race, alienage, and lineage
are congenital and unalterable traits over which the person has no control and
should not thereby suffer adverse consequences.2 A final thesis is that classifications based on race, alienage, or lineage have traditionally represented badges
of inferiority.2
This strict scrutiny approach does not depend solely upon the relative invidiousness of the particular differentiation, but also considers the relative importance of the subject for which equal protection is sought.25 Certain interests are
deemed to be fundamental to the Constitution and, when infringed, require the
higher standard of review. In the areas of voting,2" interstate travel,2 7 and criminal procedure, 8 the Court will require that the state show a compelling and
overriding interest to justify a dilution or infringement of these fundamental interests. Again, the Court has not explicitly formulated a reason why certain
interests are deemed fundamental. Perhaps the Court simply believes that these
areas are more important than others or that they are interests which have traditionally been recognized to be of preeminent importance."
It has been stated that when classifications are suspect or dilute fundamental
interests, the Court will invalidate the legislation where it perceives a less onerous
19 "A demonstration of possible rationality in the classification, suitable when taxation or
economic regulation is the sole question, is deemed insufficient to support a racial distinction."
Developments, supra note 10, at 1101.
20 "The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all
official state sources of invidious racial discrimination." Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10
(1967).
21 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
22 Developments, supra note 10, at 1125-26.
23 Id. at 1126-27.
24
Racial classifications will usually be perceived as a stigma of inferiority and a badge
of opprobrium. The same may be said of many national, ethnic, and religious classifications. In this sense, a racial or national minority differs from an economic minority.
In this sense, too, race, lineage, and ethnic origin differ from other congenital and
unalterable characteristics such as sex or certain physical disabilities.
Developments, supra note 10, at 1127.
25 Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the
Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARv. L. REv. 91, 95 (1966).
26 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
27 Shaoiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
28 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
29 Developments, supra note 10, at 1130.
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alternative," or where it finds the statute over or underinclusive. 3s There are two
approaches to this issue. First, it may be suggested that over or underinclusiveness
and less onerous alternatives are means of measuring state interest, and may be
regarded as factors to be considered in determining the sufficiency of the state
interest. Thereby, if there exist no less drastic alternatives, the state interest may
become more compelling. However, if there are less drastic means and overinclusiveness is great, these factors would diminish the state's claim that its interest is compelling. The second approach suggests that any time a classification
is suspect or a fundamental interest is diluted, the classification will be invalidated
per se regardless of questions of overinclusiveness or less onerous alternatives.
Under this view, discussions of less onerous means and over or underinclusiveness
are justifications or rationalizations for invalidating suspect classifications or classifications which infringe fundamental interests. 2
The second tier of the Warren Court's approach toward the equal protection clause rests upon the relative invidiousness of the classification and the relative importance of the interest which is infringed. Either of these factors individually may cause strict scrutiny, and it has been suggested that both in combination may also trigger the more active review. 3 This analysis might explain the
direction in which the Warren Court was moving, but fails to explain more recent
decisions. The Court has refused to utilize the active standard of review in cases
which infringed upon the interests of education or welfare benefits 5 combined
with classification of wealth.
Professor Gunther described the Warren Court's rigid two-tier attitude
toward equal protection, stating,
[S]ome situations evoked the aggressive 'new' equal protection, with scrutiny
that was 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact; in other contexts, the deferential
'old' equal protection
reigned, with minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually
38
more in fact.
Justice Harlan, dissenting in Shapiro v. Thompson,37 stated that use of the compelling interest test in any cases other than racial classification does much toward
making the court a super-legislature. The Warren Court has been criticized for
30 See Kramer v. Union School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969).
31 See N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
32 See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Haav. L. Rtv. 1, 10-11
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther].
33
The interaction of these two factors can be visualized by imagining two gradients.
Along the first of these gradients is a hierarchy of classifications, with those which
are most invidious-suspect classifications based on traits such as race-at the top.
Along the second, arranged in ascending order of importance, are interests such as
employment, education and voting. When the classification drawn lies at the top of
the first gradient, it will be subject to strict review even when the interest it affects
ranks below on the second gradient ....
As the nature of the classification becomes
less invidious (descending on the first gradient) the measure will continue to elicit
strict review only as it affects interests progressively more important. (ascending on
the second gradient).
Developments, supra note 10, at 1120-21.
34 San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
35 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
36 Gunther, supra note 32, at 8.
37 394 U.S. 618, 661 (1969).
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usurping legislative functions and preventing a majoritarian choice of values.
The Court's decisions cannot escape an appearance of subjectivity when interests which are not expressly given protection in the Constitution are denominated "fundamental" and are protected under an approach which goes
beyond the requirement of reasonable classification.n
For Justice Harlan, the evils of substantive due process and the Lochner era 9
were resurrected in the Warren Court's two-tier approach to the constitutional
demands of the equal protection clause.
B. Professor Gunther's "Equal Protection With Bite"
The Burger Court has expressed discontent with the rigid, two-tier standard
of review formulated by the Warren Court. Professor Gunther's study of the
Burger Court's 1971-72 term points to a series of discussions which Gunther
characterizes as representing "equal protection with bite."4 The Burger Court
has increasingly rejected use of the two-tier approach, but as Gunther indicates:
"The Court is prepared to use the clause as an interventionist tool without
resorting to the strict scrutiny language of the new equal protection."'" The
requirement of a compelling state interest remains to justify legislation when a
fundamental interest or suspect classification is involved, although the court has
declined to add to the list of fundamental rights or suspect classifications. The
major approach of the Burger Court is seen in cases where the Court purports
to apply the traditional minimum rationality test, yet seems to apply a stricter
standard in upholding equal protection claims.
In Reed v. Reed,42 petitioner challenged a provision of the Idaho probate
code which gave preference to men over women in applying for appointment as
administrator of a decedent's estate. Chief Justice Burger stated that the classification must, to be upheld, be found reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest on
a difference that has a fair and substantial relation to the objective of the statute.
After voicing the minimal scrutiny standard, the Chief Justice added that the
objective of reducing the work load on probate courts by eliminating one class
of contestants has some legitimacy, but concluded that the classification was
invalid as violating the equal protection clause:
To give mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of
the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is
to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and whatever may be said
in
as to the positive values of avoiding intrafamily controversy, the choice
43
this context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex.
38
39
40
41

Developments, supra note 10, at 1132.
See text accompanying notes 1 & 2 supra.
Gunther, supra note 32, at 18.
Id. at 12.

42
43

404 U.S. 71 (1971).
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971).
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The Chief Justice, in invalidating the classification, feigned the use of the minimal
rationality standard. But the decision of the lower court indicates that the classification is not wholly irrelevant to the State's objective, and facts were reasonably
conceived to justify it." Nonetheless the Supreme Court rejected the classification.
Professor Gunther has formulated a model which can be used to explain
many of the Burger Court equal protection decisions. The model suggests that
the Court views
[Ejqual protection as a means-focused, relatively narrow, preferred ground
of decision in a broad range of cases. Stated most simply it would have the
Court take seriously a constitutional requirement that has never been formally abandoned:
that legislative means must substantially further legislative
ends. 45
6 in which a Texas law requiring a candidate to pay a
Thus in Bullock v. Carter,"
filing fee as a condition to having his name placed on the ballot in a primary
election was challenged, the Court stated the standard that different treatment
must bear some relevance to the object of the legislation. The Court found that
the filing fee requirement did indeed limit the ballot to more serious candidates,
but after more careful scrutiny of the statutory means it found that the filing
fees excluded legitimate as well as frivolous candidates and thereby concluded,
"If the Texas fee requirement is intended to regulate the ballot by weeding out
spurious candidates, it is extraordinarily ill-fitted to that goal; other means to
protect those valid interests are available."' 7 And in Stanley v. Illinois," an
Illinois statutory scheme was challenged. The challenged scheme declared that,
upon the death of the mother, children of unmarried fathers were dependents of
the state. This was done without a hearing on the father's parental fitness or
proof of his neglect. Such a hearing and such proof were required before the
state assumed custody of children of married or divorced parents and unmarried
mothers. The Court said its role was to determine whether the means used to
achieve the ends were constitutionally defensible, and found: "We observe that
the state registers no gain towards its declared goals when it separates children
from the custody of fit parents." The Court apparently will accept the purposes
which are offered by the state, and will scrutinize the means to determine if they
are substantially related to those purposes.50
The requirement that legislative classifications bear a substantial relationship to legitimate purposes would prevent the Court from exercising its imagination in developing conceivable purposes for the classification or in imagining
44 The state court upheld the regulation as a rational method "to resolve an issue that
would otherwise require a hearing as to the relative merits" of the relatives, thereby reducing
the workload of the probate courts. See Reed v. Reed, 93 Idaho 511, 465 P.2d 635 (1970).
45 Gunther, supra note 32, at 20.

46 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
47 Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 146 (1972)
48 405 U.S. 645 (1972).

(footnotes omitted).

49 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972).
50 It is unclear exactly when the Burger Court will employ something more than the
Warren Court minimal rationality standard. It is our belief that there is an implicit weighing
by the Court of the individual interest involved to determine whether the middle standard
should be applied. Thus far, the Burger Court has not applied this middle standard to cases
involving business regulations.
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facts which would sustain the classification's rationality."1 As Justice Powell
stressed in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,"2 the Texas statutory scheme
for financing public education must be examined to determine whether it rationally furthers some "legitimate, articulated state purposes."5 " As a corollary to
this notion that the Court will not stretch to conceive purposes or facts justifying
the classification, the Gunther model would have the Court accept the purposes
offered by the State, unless the purposes are clearly illegitimate. Presumably, if
the Court finds the purposes to be illegitimate, the classification will be held
invalid.
The final element of Professor Gunther's model is that judicial tolerance of
overinclusive and underinclusive classifications is markedly diminished.54 One
of the evils of the Kansas recoupment statute which enabled the state to recover
legal defense fees for indigent defendants in subsequent civil proceedings, challenged in James v. Strange,"'was that it deprived an indigent defendant of protective exemptions Kansas provided for other civil judgment debtors. "[O]ther
Kansas statutes providing for recoupment of public assistance to indigents do not
include the severe provisions imposed on indigent defendants in this case.""6
Professor Gunther, then, suggests a model whose approach would (1) concern itself with means and not ends, permitting the state to select means that
substantially further the legislative purposes, (2) limit judicial consideration
to purposes supplied by the state and eliminate imaginative judicial construction
of facts justifying the classifications, and (3) reduce judicial tolerance of overinclusive and underinclusive classifications.

C. The Marshall Model of Equal Protection
Gunther indicates that while his model may be helpful in analyzing many of
Court equal protection decisions, it does not account for all of the
Burger
the
break from the Warren Court mold, such as Reed v. Reed"7
which
decisions

It would have the Court assess the means in terms of legislative purposes that have
substantial basis in actuality, not merely in conjecture. Moreover, it would have the
justices gauge the reasonableness of a questionable means on the basis of materials
that are offered to the Court, rather than resorting to rationalizations created by a
perfunctory judicial hypothesizing.
Gunther, supra note 32, at 21.
52 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
53 San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (emphasis added).
54 Gunther, supra note 32, at 20.
55 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
56 james v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 137 (1972). The Warren Court's use of minimal
scrutiny would not overturn a classification where not made with mathematical nicety or because it resulted in some inequality. The Burger Court's equal protection with bite requires
that the statutes be more narrowly tailored to their legitimate objective, although some imprecision and inequality may be tolerated. This is not to suggest that the Burger Court is more
activist than the Warren Court. It is conceivable that in cases where the Burger Court applies
this middle standard, the Warren Court may have employed the compelling state interest test
so as to invalidate the classification. What is proposed is that there may be more room to
challenge a classification under what the Burger Court calls minimal rationality than there was
when the Warren Court employed a minimal rationality standard.
57 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
51

[Vol. 51:873]

EQUAL PROTECTION, SOCIAL WELFARE LITIGATION

881

and Eisenstadt v. Baird.- , The model seems to be more of a suggested basis for
principled "equal protection with bite" decisions in the future than adequate
explanation of such past decisions. In light of more recent decisions, it appears
that additional factors must be considered to fully explore the Burger Court's
approach to equal protection. Such additional factors may be found in a model
suggested by Justice Marshall's dissent in San Antonio School District v. Rod9
riguez.
A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it has applied
a spectrum of standards, in,reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of
the Equal Protection Clause. This spectrum clearly comprehends variations
in the degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize particular classifications, depending, I believe, on the 'constitutional and societal importance
of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis
upon which the particular classification is drawn. I find in fact that many
of the Court's recent decisions embody ... an approach in which the "concentration [is] placed upon the character of the classification in question,
the relative importance to the individuals in the class discriminated against
of the governmental benefits that they do6 not receive, and the asserted state
interests in support of the classification."
The Marshall model, then, requires the Court (1) to look at the character of
the classifications in question and (2) to balance the benefits accruing to society
if the classification is sustained against the importance of the individual interests
61
infringed and the long-term adverse effects on those interests.
It appears that, in considering the character of a classification, the Court
is not ready to deem certain classifications suspect, yet it feels that these classifications warrant a tighter scrutiny than other classifications. These classifications
might be called "quasi-suspect." The prime example of this is a classification
based on sex. It does not appear that a majority of the court has accepted sex
as a suspect classification, despite an opinion to that effect by four justices in
Frontiero v. Richardsone In that case, the Court found it unreasonably discriminating to require a servicewoman to show that her husband was dependent
on her for over half his support before she was eligible for increased quarters
allowance and medical benefits for her husband, while servicemen were not subject to this requirement. However, it appears from Reed v. Reed 3 and a con64 (which would base the decision squarely on Reed)'
curring opinion in Frontiero
that members of the Court more closely scrutinized the classification because it
was sexual in nature. In both cases, the classifications seemed to be, at the least,
58 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Gunther, supra note 32, at 29-30. Gunther indicates that even
more than minimum rationality was satisfied in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and that
the reason for the decision may be in the nature of the classification. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972), the Court refuses to accept the seemingly legitimate purposes offered by
the State.
59 411 U.S. 1 (1973).

60 San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973)
senting).

(Marshall, 3., dis-

61 See, Note, The Evolution of Equal Protection-Education,Municipal Services, and
Wealth, 7 HARV.Civ. RiGHTs-CIv. LIB. L. REv. 103 (1972).

62 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
63 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
64 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 692 (1973).
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minimally rational. In neither case did there appear to be such strong individual
interests involved as to outweigh the interest of the government in the classification.65
The next component of the Marshall model involves the weighing of the
governmental interest in the classification against the individual interest injured
by the classification. This balancing test is applied in all cases, regardless of
whether the character of the classification is "quasi-suspect." The Court must
consider the extent of the benefits to society as well as the degree of risk which
would be incurred if the classification is disallowed. Secondly, it must examine
the importance of the rights infringed and the extent to which there will be a
long-term adverse effect on those interests." Although no precisely calibrated
scale is provided by which to weigh these interests, Marshall provides some guidelines by suggesting a sliding scale with which to assess what type of individual
interest will demand a strong state interest to justify the classification." Marshall
seems to be saying that the more closely related a nonconstitutional interest is to
a constitutionally protected right, the closer should be the judicial scrutiny of a
classification affecting that interest. For example where education is the interest
at stake, the Court may tighten its scrutiny because education bears a close relation to the effective use of the rights of voting and free speech.6"
The Marshall model, then, involves the two steps of (1) considering the
nature of the classification involved, and (2) weighing the competing interests
asserted. Within the model, however, these steps may not be fully independent of
each other, thereby triggering the use of a second sliding scale. As the character
of the classification becomes more suspect, the stricter will be the requirement of
an important state interest which outweighs the individual interests at stake.
D. The Unitary Approach to Equal Protection

The Gunther and Marshall approaches have been presented as distinct
models, yet it is clear that they may be used in the alternative to explain recent

65 It is unclear exactly what types of classifications will trigger a stricter scrutiny from
the Court, but still be less than that of suspect classifications. It appears that the Court will
give closer scrutiny to classifications based on sex, wealth, age and perhaps in other areas over
which the individual has little or no control.
66 San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
67
Although not all fundamental interests are constitutionally guaranteed, the determination of which interests are fundamental should be firmly rooted in the text of the
constitution ....
As the nexus between the specific constitutional guarantee and the
nonconstitutional interest draws closer, the nonconstitutional interest becomes more
fundamental and the degree of judicial scrutiny applied when the interest is infringed
on a discriminatory basis must be adjusted accordingly.
Id. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
68 While this example seems clear cut, few other such examples come readily to mind.
Marshall has not provided a tool which is very useful. He undoubtedly was trying to provide
a method of assessing the importance of individual interest other than leaving it purely to the
subjective preferences of individual Justices. However, the task of tying a nonconstitutional
interest to a constitutional right seems to be too wide open a process, limited only by the parameters of judicial imagination. Once again, there is no precisely calibrated scale by which to
judge how closely an interest relates to a constitutional guarantee. And in addition, the question
should be raised whether some constitutional rights are more fundamental than others and
if it matters to which of the constitutional rights the interest is being tied.
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decisions."s Although in many cases the models overlap, in other decisions the
only feasible explanation for the outcome is found in a combination of the two
models. Such an approach was suggested by Justice Marshall's dissent in Dandridge v. Williams.7" In one part of his opinion, Marshall analyzes the impact of
the classification on the individual interests at stake (partial loss of welfare benefits) as compared to the degree to which the interests put forth by Maryland
were furthered by a maximum welfare benefit. If Marshall had simply weighed
the state interests against the individual interests, he would have concluded that
either the state's interests were more important than partial loss of benefits to an
AFDC family, or that the partial loss of benefits was more important than the
state interests. Yet Marshall did not reach such a conclusion. In order to compare the interests at stake, Marshall first applied a Gunther-like precision test,
determining the classification to be vastly over and underinclusive. Marshal's
conclusion was not that the state's interests are less important than the individual's
right to full welfare payments, but that, given the imprecise manner in which
the means accomplish the ends, the state interest must be found less important
than the individual interests involved.
The use of the Gunther and Marshall models in combination aids in understanding the unitary approach to equal protection cases. It is unclear whether
the Court has consciously employed these two models in its decision-making
process, but through the use of both models all relevant considerations may be
taken into account. Utilizing both models requires the use of a sliding scale of
scrutiny.71 The stronger the individual interests are, as compared to the state's
concerns, the more rigid will be the requirement that the means be substantially
related to the articulated purpose. When the result of the interest balancing is
that an important individual interest outweighs the state interests involved, the
test for precision becomes stricter, thereby requiring that the classification be more
precisely drawn. Conversely, as the individual interest becomes less important or
the state interests more important, the less strict will be the requirement of precision. There is a point on this sliding scale analysis where the individual interests
affected may be of such great importance or so fundamental, that the classification will not be upheld no matter how precisely drawn. At the opposite end
of the spectrum where the individual interests affected are of minimal importance, the classification will be given effect regardless of how imprecisely it is

69 A similar type of sliding scale has been suggested in determining reasonableness in
scrutinizing fourth amendment violations occurring at border searches. See Almeida-Sanchez
v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 275 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring); Henderson v. United
States, 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967).
70 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
71
The requisite level of precision is uncertain, and may vary according to the invidiousness of the classification or the importance of the personal interests infringed.... In
effect, then, active review comprehends two levels of balancing. At the first level, the
court will inquire whether the importance of the personal interests involved is so great
as to outweigh the state's interest in being free to accomplish its objectives through
rough accommodations, rather than with scientific precision. But even if the state
classifies precisely, the court will inquire further whether the state interests advanced
by the classification are sufficient to outweigh the injury done to the individual by
the particular unequal treatment to which he is subjected. Note, The Supreme Court,
1969 Term, 84 HzAv. L. Rav. 1, 63-64 (1970).
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drawn."2 It is only when there is a genuine conflict between the importance of
the individual interests being deprived and the state interests advanced by the
classification, that issues of precision and of reasonable alternative means will be
considered. A classification, then, will be upheld provided it is precisely enough
drawn to achieve a state objective that outweighs the personal interests involved."
Any use of the unitary approach to invalidate legislation will subject the
approach to the attack that it is simply substantive due process in the guise of
equal protection. The active use of equal protection to strike down legislation
will perhaps always be subject to the type of criticism which Mr. Justice White
issued concerning the court's decision in Roe v. Wade. 4
As an exercise of raw judicial power, the Court perhaps has authority to do
what it does today; but in my view its judgment is an improvident and
extravagant exercise of
the power of judicial review which the Constitution
7 5
extends to the Court.

It is indeed dangerous to allow the Court "both to 'define' and to 'balance' interests on the major social and political issues of our time. ' 76 As the standard of
review becomes more rigid, the greater, too, is the likelihood that the Court will
institute substantive due process in invalidating legislation. The unitary approach,
however, allows such rigid review only where the individual interests at stake outweigh the articulated state needs. As the individual interests become increasingly
more important it is easier to justify a stricter scrutiny and a more intense review
by the Court to insure that the means are substantially related to the articulated
purpose. This approach would prevent the type of substantive due process in
the area of economic legislation of which Justices Harlan and Holmes expressed
so much fear, while allowing substantial protection for important individual
interests. The use of the unitary approach, then, may provide a principled
standard for reviewing equal protection challenges, while avoiding the label of
substantive due process.
III. The Unitary Approach to Equal Protection as
Applied to Welfare Cases
The standard of review traditionally applied to welfare equal protection
cases is aptly summarized by this excerpt from the majority opinion in Dand77
ridge v. Williams:
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws
are imperfect. If the classification has some "reasonable basis," it does not
72 This approach, then, includes not only a middle standard but also encompasses the
Warren Court two-tier approach to equal protection. Hence, it is referred to as the unitary
approach.
73 Note, supra note 70, at 63-64.
74 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
75 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 222 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
76 Epstein, Substantive Due Process By Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, SUPREME
CouRT EvsEW 159, 185 (1973).
77 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
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offend the Constitution simply because the classification "is not made with
mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality." ....
"A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.178
Dandridge involved a challenge to Maryland's Aid to Families with Dependent
Children program which imposed a maximum grant limit of $250 per month
per family, regardless of the size of the family or the computed standard of need.
The equal protection attack was based on the claim that such a maximum grant
limit caused discrimination among welfare recipients solely on the basis of the
size of the family. In its holding, the Court specifically committed itself to
the most minimal of rationality standards in its review of welfare cases. In
Dandridge,the Court virtually apologizes for the standard, saying that it applied
to cases which
have in the main involved state regulation of business or industry. The
administration of public welfare assistance, by contrast, involves the most
basic economic needs of impoverished human beings. We recognize the
dramatically real factual difference between the cited cases and this one,
but
we can find no basis for applying a different constitutional standard.7 9
...

It is this recognition of the "dramatically real factual difference" between welfare
cases and those of economic regulation which provides at least a starting point
in explaining some apparent movement by the Court away from the old minimum rationality standard in welfare cases.
The Court consistently adhered to the minimum rationality standard in
language and effect until the summer of 1973. In cases like Jefferson v. Hackney,"o and more recently in Ortwein v. Schwab,8 the court explicitly reaffirmed
the Dandridge standard. The claim in equal protection cases that welfare be considered a fundamental right has been consistently rejected. The prospects for those
advancing a welfare equal protection claim, other than those who could rely on
an accepted fundamental right or suspect classification, were not at all promising
until the announcement of two decisions in similar cases on June 25, 1973. In
these two decisions, U.S. Dep't. of Agriculture v. Murry,82 and U.S. Dep't. of
Agriculture v. Moreno,"s the Court purported to apply the minimum rationality
test, yet in result, seemed to apply a stricter standard.
In Murry, § 5 (b) of the Food Stamp Act84 was challenged. That section
provided that a household was ineligible for food stamps if it included a member
who had reached his eighteenth birthday and was claimed as a dependent for
federal income tax purposes by a taxpayer who was a member of a different
household ineligible for food stamps. The household disqualified by the statute
was to be ineligible for the tax period claimed and the year following. Through
Justice Douglas, the Court ruled this provision was without a rational basis.
78

Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).

79

Id.

80
81
82

Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
United States Dep't of Agri. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973).

83
84

United States Dept. of Agri. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
7 U.S.C. § 2014(b) (1970).
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Justice Douglas indicated that it was not rational to base the need of an entire
household on the fact that only one member was claimed as a dependent by
someone outside the household, especially when the penalty fell on the household
for a year following the tax claim. The irrationality in this case was heightened
by the fact that plaintiffs indicated that they had, in fact, received no support
from those claiming them as dependents. 8
In Moreno, § 3(e) of the Food Stamp Act8e was challenged. It limited
food stamp eligibility to households whose members were all related to each other.
In an opinion by Justice Brennan, the Court ruled that the distinction between
related and nonrelated households not only was irrelevant to the purposes of the
Act, but was wholly without rational basis in serving any other legitimate purpose.8" Moreno will be discussed further later.
Both these cases were against the Federal Government and thus decided on
fifth amendment due process grounds, but it is clear that the Court is talking in
equal protection terms. In both cases the Court invalidates the statutory provisions which classify similarly situated people into different categories. In
Moreno, Brennan makes it dear that he is applying the "traditional" equal protection test of Jefferson and Dandridge."
Justice Rehnquist dissented in both Murry and Moreno, as he said, "for
much the same reasons."8 In both, he found minimum rationality satisfied. In
Murry, Rehnquist found a correlation between one household's ineligibility for
food stamps and the fact that that household has a member claimed as a dependent by a member of another ineligible household. According to the tax laws,
he reasoned, the dependent is receiving over half his support from someone
whose income is enough to disqualify his own household. This indicates that the
dependent is receiving significant support and it is thus rational to assume that
he is ineligible for food stamps.9 0 In Moreno, Rehnquist claims that the requirement that all members of a household be related to each other will as least eliminate the91 fraud perpetrated by those who form households only to receive food
stamps.
It appears that Justice Rehnquist is technically correct. According to the
"any set of facts" standard enunciated in Dandridge and Jefferson, the classifications created in Murry and Moreno do appear to be minimally rational. Certainly facts can be conceived, as Justice Rehnquist did, which indicate that these
regulations could reduce fraud. What, then, is the rationale for the result
reached by the Court in Murry and Moreno?
While Murry and Moreno may represent an abandonment of the most
minimal of rationality standards, they do not necessarily represent an overturning
of cases like Dandridge and Jefferson. It may be that the classifications over85
86
87

United States Dep't of Agri. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 510 (1973).
7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (1970).
United States Dep't of Agri. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973).
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Id.

at 533.

89 Id. at 545 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
90 United States Dep't of Agri. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 525 (1973)
dissenting).
91 United States Dep't of Agri. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 546 (1973)
dissenting).

(Rehnquist,

3.,

(Rlehnquist, J.,
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turned in Murry and Moreno are simply less rational than those attacked in
previous welfare equal protection cases, even though they are minimally rational.
The Court may have decided that although mathematical nicety is not required
in classifications, there is a limit somewhere short of complete irrationality to
what it will tolerate. However, the important point is not that the statutes in
Murry and Moreno present less rational classifications than the statutes in previous cases, but that these cases indicate that there is room to challenge welfare
regulations on a rationality basis that goes somewhat beyond earlier notions of
"minimum."
An alternative explanation to Murry and Moreno is that they involve a
factor not present in other cases. In Moreno, Brennan indicates that the challenged statute was an attempt to discriminate against a politically unpopular
group, hippies and hippie communes. He indicates that this would not be a
legitimate government interest. 2 Murry and Moreno, then, may represent an
attempt by the Court to bend over backwards to protect a discrete minority
from discrimination, that is, the creation of an additional "quasi-suspect" classification. This would not be the first time the Court has taken a closer look at
legislative enactments suspected to be of this character."3 However, in light of
other factors, it does not appear that the Murry and Moreno decisions can be
explained as a protection of politically unpopular groups. The facts in Murry
really do not indicate an attack on hippies, but rather an attack on children of
more affluent families (who may or may not be hippies). 4 And in light of the
discussion in the first part of this article, it seems that Murry and Moreno fit into
the pattern of equal protection cases already decided by the Court which have
utilized the unitary approach. The following analysis will indicate what factors
seem to be important, particularly in light of Murry and Moreno, to evoke the
unitary approach to equal protection from the Supreme Court in welfare cases.
At the outset, it should be emphasized that a welfare equal protection challenge need not be based on a claim of right.9" The principle is well established
that although there may not be, as yet, a right to welfare, just as there is no right
to appeal from a criminal conviction, 6 a legislature cannot arbitrarily exclude
some people from a benefit it extends to others.
The Court continues to talk in minimum rationality terms. To be overturned a classification must be shown to be arbitrary. But, "it is not arbitrariness
in the abstract which can be challenged successfully, but rather constitutional
arbitrariness considered against the purpose of the welfare program, and the competing interest asserted. 97 This type of arbitrariness is indicated by Reed v.
Reed.9" The Court does not directly declare the regulation to be arbitrary, but
92 Id. at 534.
93 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53, n.4 (1938). South
Carolina v. Bornwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184, n.2 (1938).
94 United States Dep't of Agri. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 515-16 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
95 For discussion of this point, see Comment, Equal Protection As a Measure of Competing
Interests in Welfare Litigation, 21 ME. L. REv. 175 (1969).
96 See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
97 Comment, supra note 95, at 177.
98 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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finesses the point by saying,
[T]o give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members
of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits,
is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
The classification in Reed was not arbitrary in an absolute sense, but arbitrary in
light of its purpose and the character of the classification.
In proving a classification to be constitutionally arbitrary, it must be shown
that an important individual interest is at stake. A convincing argument can be
made that had Murry and Moreno involved business or economic regulations
instead of food stamps, the Court would not have taken as close a look at the
statutes and would have upheld them despite their imperfections. It is difficult
to believe that the Court could remain oblivious to the individual interests
asserted, even though they may not be deemed "fundamental." The importance
of the individual interest is built into most welfare cases, since they do concern
"the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings."' 0 And, it is
not merely the interests of the individual plaintiff which must be considered, but
those of the entire class of potential plaintiffs he represents. Thus, though the
interest in welfare benefits is not constitutionally fundamental, it is sufficiently
important to trigger more careful scrutiny of asserted state interests and the means
chosen to advance them. 0 1
Regarding the state's interest in the regulation, claims that the interest is
not legitimate, or that the articulated state purpose is not really a purpose of the
state0 2 appear to be open. Otherwise, in most cases where there is a legitimate
state interest, it must be shown to be less important than the individual interest
infringed. Murry and Moreno indicate one possible avenue to accomplish this.
It may be helpful to show that the regulation in question serves a purpose which
is either irrelevant or relates only indirectly to the overall policy of the statute
involved. In Murry and Moreno, the regulations were passed to eliminate fraud,
a legitimate government purpose, while the overall policy of the Food Stamp
Act was to improve nutritional levels in low income households and stimulate
While elimination of fraud may not be irrelevant
the agricultural economy.'
to the Food Stamp Program, it certainly is not a central objective. And, in Murry
and Moreno, not only did the regulations serve the extrinsic state interest of fighting fraud, but they worked against the overall purpose of the Food Stamp Act
by eliminating "innocent," qualified people from eligibility.
Regardless of whether the state interest relates directly or is extrinsic to the
overall policy of the statute, the precision with which that state interest is served
is a decisive factor. If fraud had been effectively diminished by the statutes in
99
100

Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).

102
103

See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
United States Dep't of Agri. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533-34 (1973).

101 To use the Marshall approach, a tenuous argument can be made that the receipt of
welfare benefits is closely related, to various constitutional rights because welfare provides the
means of subsistence on which many people depend in order to exercise any of their constitutional rights.
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Murry and Moreno, chances are they would have withstood constitutional challenge. Justice Brennan found in Moreno that those people who had formed a
household to fraudulently claim food stamps would be able to change their living
circumstances in order to qualify, and "only those persons who are so desperately
in need of aid that they cannot even afford to alter their living arrangements"
would be excluded. 4 Brennan's logic can be questioned. Certainly some people
with fraudulent claims to food stamps would be eliminated by the regulation
requiring all household members to be related. All of the fraudulent claimants
would not bother to disrupt their living arrangements in order to receive food
stamps. Certain attachments form between people living in the same household
which may outweigh the importance of splitting up a household merely to get
food stamps. In these cases, the regulation appears to combat fraud and is thus
minimally rational. However, the point to be underlined is that the regulation
served to eliminate fraud in such an imprecise manner that the Court was able
to find it irrational. It is this imprecision, as well as the fact that a regulation
may work counter to overall policy, which apparently influenced the court to
invalidate these regulations.
A corollary to the claim that the means employed serve the ends imprecisely
is a contention that there are alternative means which can be utilized to serve
similar ends without the damning imprecision. The fact that the purposes are
served with imprecision suggests that other ways of serving these purposes are
likely to be available. In Murry and Moreno, the Court recognized that there
were other provisions, such as criminal sanctions, already in effect to minimize
fraud. If the state ends can be achieved by means that do not threaten the interests protected by the equal protection clause, the Court should be shown those
05
means..
One final factor, not raised in Murry and Moreno, to be considered when
seeking the unitary approach to equal protection is the character of the classification. Discussion earlier in this article showed that classifications such as those
based on sex evoke a stricter scrutiny from the Court. A growing body of case
law suggests that if the basis for a classification is something over which the individual has little control, the Court may take cognizance of the relative invidiousness of the classification and adjust its standard of review accordingly. In welfare cases, if wealth is the basis for a classification, then the Court's attention
should be brought to the quasi-suspect character of the classification. However,
most welfare equal protection challenges do not involve wealth as the basis for
the classification. Most or all welfare regulations distinguish groups of the poor
on some other basis, like family size.' 6
There are various ways to summarize the process by which the unitary
approach to equal protection is evoked from the Court. One formulation is that
in cases of conflict between individual interest and legitimate state interest, the
104 Id. at 538 (emphasis added).
105 The Court should be shown those means merely to suggest that there are ways of accomplishing the state ends with more precision. It is not suggested that plaintiff provide alternatives
so that the Court can prescribe what alternatives should be utilized. This would be a usurpation
of the legislative function. By showing that alternatives exist, plaintiff diminishes, at least to
some degree, the state interest in that particular classification.
106 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
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more important the individual interest, the greater the precision the Court will
demand in the means-ends relationship. Yet, there are cases where the Court
first assesses the importance of the state interest by examining how precisely it is
served by the means. Essentially, the process can be summarized by saying that
as the individual interest (including the interest in not being stigmatized by an
invidious classification) grows more important, and the state interest (including
its interest in being free from demands to regulate with precision) diminishes,
the Court will apply a stricter scrutiny.
IV. Application of the Unitary Approach Dandridge v. Williams
The foregoing analysis of the unitary approach to equal protection will be
applied to Dandridge v. Williams,"' a case which illustrates a prototypical application of the "old" minimum rationality standard by the Supreme Court. Dandridge will be compared to Moreno.
The first basis for comparison is the character of the classifications involved.
In Dandridge,the basis of the classification was family size; in Moreno, whether
or not all household members were related to each other. In neither case is the
classification close to being suspect, so the natures of these two classifications are
not distinguishable in a significant way. If anything, one might claim that the
Dandridge classification invites stricter scrutiny because it discriminates against
a weaker, more powerless minority (welfare families with many children) than
the Moreno classification (impoverished families with several independent, but
unrelated, adults). At any rate, it would be difficult to account for the difference
in outcome of these two cases by reference to the character of their classifications.
Likewise, a comparison of the individual interests infringed by the statutes
challenged in Moreno and Dandridge does not explain their difference in outcome. Both cases involve the provision of subsistence resources to impoverished
people. One might contend that the welfare benefits lost in Dandridge (through
the imposition of a maximum grant) are even more important than the food
stamp benefits lost in Moreno. Food stamps are often supplemental to welfare
payments, and people who do not qualify for welfare may qualify for food stamps.
Thus welfare payments may be claimed to provide more basic sustenance than
food stamps. On the other hand, one could contend that the individual interest
in Moreno is more important because a total loss of benefit is threatened, while
in Dandridge there is only a partial loss. Notwithstanding these arguments, the
individual interests in these cases are comparable and hardly explain the difference in outcome.
Next, the states' interests served by the regulations in these two cases should
be compared. Neither regulation serves the alleged purpose of the statute involved very well. In both cases, the government provides other legitimate purposes which the classifications serve. In Dandridge, the purpose of the AFDC
program is presumably to aid as many families with needy children as possible in
an equitable fashion and to promote family unity. Maryland does not justify its
benefit ceiling by claiming it serves these ends, but justifies it because it provides
107

Id.
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incentive to work, maintains a balance in income between welfare recipients and
wage earners, encourages family planning and allows allocation of resources to a
greater number of families. 8 In Moreno, the requirement that all household
members be related does not serve the purpose of raising nutritional levels in lowincome households or stimulating the agricultural economy. The state interest
claimed is the diminution of fraudulent claims to food stamps. In neither Dandridge nor Moreno do the interests of the state appear to be compelling or overriding. In Dandridge, one could argue that the interests the state presents to the
Supreme Court are mere afterthoughts; the main purpose of a maximum grant is
to save money for the state and any other purposes served are incidental. The
state's interest in preventing fraud claimed in Moreno is primarily an interest in
administrative efficiency, hardly a compelling state interest. The only real difference, then, between the state interests served is that the state offers four interests
in Dandridge and only one in Moreno. The difference is one of quantity more
than quality.
The precision with which the means serve the ends is the next basis on
which to compare the two cases. In both cases, the classifications can be found
to be vastly over and underinclusive. In Moreno, the attempt to disqualify households of unrelated individuals fraudulently clairing benefits also incidentally
disqualified other legitimately needy households having unrelated members.
Their need is as real as those of "related" households, yet they have no chance
to prove that their claim to food stamps is legitimate. The regulation is underinclusive since there are many fraudulent claims which this regulation will not
affect at all. (Other provisions of the Food Stamp Act do, however, deal with
other types of fraud, thus making the entire scheme somewhat less underinclusive).
In upholding the regulation in Dandridge,the majority of the Court actually
relied on only two of the four offered state interests. 109 Why the Court did not
rely on the other two purposes (encouragement of family planning and aid to
the largest possible number of families) is unclear. Perhaps the Court felt that
these interests were so remotely (imprecisely) served or hard to measure that they
did not warrant discussion.
It is difficult to assess the precision with which the nebulous state purpose
of balancing economic status between welfare recipients and wage earners is
served. Marshal's dissent indicates that the majority may not have relied on
this ground at all since the facts on the record do not clearly indicate that this
& 0 He also indicates that in other states, the benefit ceiling does
goal was served.
not bear the desired relation to the minimum wage."' It is conceivable, therefore, that this state interest was not served at all by the Maryland maximum
grant scheme.
The discussion of the precision with which means serve ends in Dandridge
thus narrows to one articulated state interest, the benefit ceiling as a work incen108

Id. at 483-84.

109
110

Id. at 486.
Id. at 524 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

111

Id.
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five. Again, Marshall's dissent indicates how imprecisely this goal is served." 2
The classification is overinclusive because many families affected by the ceiling
do not have an employable member. It is grossly underinclusive because the work
incentive applies only to the small minority of recipients whose families are large
enough to be affected by the maximum, and then only those with an employable
member.
The conclusion is that the precision with which means serve ends in both
Moreno and Dandridge is minimal. It is difficult to say whether there is considerably more imprecision in one than the other. It follows that the difference
in outcome cannot clearly be attributed to the comparative precision with which
the means serve the ends.
There may be a series of factors which cumulatively explain why the equal
protection claim was upheld in Moreno and rejected in Dandridge. Perhaps it
was important that in Dandridge the Court was dealing with the setting of welfare benefit levels, an area traditionally left to state discretion.'
Perhaps the
four state interests in Dandridge were significantly more important than the one
offered in Moreno. Or perhaps the Court saw the statute in Moreno as having
a significantly less precise means-end relationship than Dandridge. One other
explanation previously provided is that Moreno involved discrimination against a
politically unpopular group. All of these explanations are possible, yet it must be
concluded that in the four major areas in the analysis (nature of classification,
individual interest, state interest, means-end precision), these two cases are largely
comparable.
Some dicta from Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion in Moreno provides an interesting conclusion to this analysis. Said Douglas, "But for the First
Amendment aspect of the case, Dandridge would control here.""' 4 Douglas was
alone in finding the first amendment right of association to be the crucial factor
in invalidating the regulation in Moreno. One wonders how the remainder of
the majority decided that Dandridge does not control Moreno. Douglas' comment lends force to speculation that if Dandridgewere decided today, there might
indeed be a different result.
V. Recent Supreme Court Decisions
More recent Supreme Court decisions in the area of equal protection and
social welfare legislation shed as much light, or produce as much confusion, as
do prior cases. The difficulty of discerning an articulated equal protection
analysis is compounded by the fact that the most recent cases often involve classifications that have either been held suspect" 5 or quasi-suspect," 6 or involve a
fundamental right .1 7 However, much of the majority or dissenting opinions
support the thesis of this article.
112 Id.
113 See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
114 United States Dep't. of Agri. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 544 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
115 Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (illegitimacy).
116 Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (sex); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S.
636 (1975) (sex).
117 Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (right to travel).
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Although Shapiro v. Thompson118 was found dispositive of the equal protection attack on Arizona's residence duration requirement for free medical care,
the Court in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County"9 did not simply state
that a compelling state interest would be necessary to uphold the classification.

Rather the Court cited Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 2 " and Dunn v.
Blumstein,"' for the proposition that the Court must initially look to the nature
of the classification and the individual interests affected. 2 This language suggests that equal protection analysis initially involves a balancing process to determine the level of scrutiny.
The opinion in Maricopa County represents a somewhat similar but more
limited attack on the two-tier system. Rather than providing several levels
of review, it merely prevents the application of strict scrutiny until the
deprivation
involved reaches a certain level of importance to the indi23
vidual.1

The statutory provision attacked in Jiminez v. Weinberger124 involved a
classification based on illegitimacy. Although there was precedental support for
simply requiring a compelling state interest to uphold this type of classification," 5
the Court utilized a different equal protection approach. The Court first stated
that the statute could not be read to support the articulatedstate purpose. 6 The
Court thereby indicated that it would look closely only at such articulated purposes and would no longer accept any conceivable state purpose to justify the
classification. The Court did not stop its analysis in its rejection of the articulated
purpose, but rather proceeded to closely scrutinize the means-end relationship.
It does not follow, however, that the blanket and conclusive exclusion of
appellant's subclass of illegitimates is reasonably related to the prevention
of spurious claims. Assuming that the appellants are in fact dependent on
the claimant, it would not serve the purposes of the Act to conclusively deny
them an opportunity to establish their dependency and their right to insurance benefits, and it would discriminate between the two subclasses of afterborn illegitimates without any basis for the distinction since
the potential for
127
spurious claims is exactly the same as to both subclasses.'
The statutory classification was held to be unconstitutionally imprecise. It was
overinclusive since it benefitted some children who are not dependent on their
disabled parent, and underinclusive since it excludes some children who are
dependent upon their disabled parent. 28
118 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
119 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
120 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
121 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
122 Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 253 (1974); see also Sosna v.
Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) which can be explained through the use of this initial balancing
approach to determine the level of scrutiny the Court will employ.
123 The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARv. L. REv. 41, 115 (1974).
124 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
125 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
126 .iminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 634-36 (1974).
127 Id. at 636.
128 Id. at 637.
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It is important to note that the Court invalidated the statutory scheme by
using the precision analysis rather than by simply finding that the state had failed
to supply a sufficiently compelling interest. Rather than using the language of
strict scrutiny, the Court closely analyzed both the statutory means and ends and
found the statutory scheme to be unconstitutionally imprecise since the purpose
was not effectively served by the means. Seemingly the Court chose to closely
scrutinize the statutory scheme after an initial determination that the individual
interests affected (insurance benefits) and the invidiousness of the classification
(illegitimacy) outweighed the articulated state purpose of preventing spurious
claims.
Two cases to be analyzed involve gender-based classifications. In Schlesinger
v. Ballard..9 the statutory scheme was upheld, while in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld" the scheme was found violative of equal protection. In Schlesinger v.
Ballard,a male naval officer was subject to mandatory discharge under 10 U.S.C.
§ 6382 (a) when he failed for a second time to be promoted to the grade of lieutenant commander. The petitioner raised an equal protection challenge claiming
that women officers are subject to 10 U.S.C. § 6401 which entitles them to thirteen years of commissioned service before being mandatorily discharged for want
of promotion. The Court first found the legislative purpose to be the maintenance
of effective leadership, and then distinguished this purpose from the administrative or fiscal considerations of cases such as Frontiero v. Richardson.' The
Court then indicated it had used a precision test in both Reed v. Reed.. and
Frontiero,by stating that the gender-based classifications were struck down since
based on overbroad generalizations. " ' In Schlesinger,however, the Court upheld
the classification as based on the "demonstrable fact" that male and female naval
officers are not similarly situated with respect to opportunities for professional
service." The use of the term "demonstrable" indicates that although the Court
is willing to uphold a sex-based classification, it will look at demonstrable evidence to find if the legislative purpose is in fact aided by the statutory means.
Justice Brennan, in dissent, first argues that gender-based distinctions must
be subject to "close judicial scrutiny," but then he utilizes the strict scrutiny language of the compelling state interest test."35 After stating that the Government
failed to show a compelling interest, Justice Brennan analyzes the classification
by closely scrutinizing the articulated purpose"6 and the means-end relationship."' The dissent differs from the majority, therefore, in the extent to which
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136

419 U.S. 498 (1975).
420 U.S. 636 (1975).
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 602-6 (1975).
404 U.S. 71 (1971).
Schlesinzer v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 506-507 (1975).
Id. at 508.
Id- at 511 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
[Wlhile we have in the past exercised our imaginations to conceive of possible rational
justifications for statutory classifications, we have recently declined to manufacture
justifications in order to serve an apparently invalid statutory classification ...
Moreover, we have analyzed asserted governmental interests to determine whether
they were in fact the legislative purpose of a statutory classification . . . and have
limited our inquiry to the legislature's stated purposes when these purposes are clearly
set out in the statute or its legislative history.
Id. at 520 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
137 Id. at 518, n.9.
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it will scrutinize the legislative classification.
This decision reflects the competing balancing tests. Justice Brennan characterizes the classification as a gender-based distinction and finds that the petitioner's interest in avoiding the invidious nature of this quasi-suspect classification
outweighs the articulated legislative purpose. He thereby subjects the means-end
relationship to close judicial scrutiny. The majority, on the other hand, although
stating that the governmental interest to be served is maintaining effective leadership, actually believed that the governmental interest is in compensating women
line officers for their inferior position in the Navy (less opportunity for professional service).'8 Characterizing the legislative interest as beneficient in nature,
the majority must have found that the governmental interest outweighed the
individual interest at stake. With the balance tipping in favor of the governmental interest, the majority was not as willing as the dissent to require strict
precision in the statutory scheme. But, significantly, although the majority did
not require as strict precision as the dissent, it did closely scrutinize the scheme
so as to require "the demonstrable fact" that male and female officers are not
similarly situated with respect to opportunities for professional service. Although
this scrutiny was not as strict as the dissent would have required, it is more than
would be required under the minimum rationality standard.
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld3 9 involved an attack on 42 U.S.C. § 4 02(g).
Under that provision of the Social Security Act, benefits which are based on the
earnings of a deceased husband and father are payable, with limitations, both
to the widow and the couple's minor children. Benefits based on the earnings
of a deceased wife and mother, however, are payable only to the minor children
and not to the widower. The classification was found indistinguishable from that
invalidated in Frontiero v. Richardson1 4 ' and thereby struck down as based on
an "archaic and overbroad" generalization. 41 This case added a new term to
the confused levels of scrutiny required by the equal protection standard when it
stated, "benefits must be distributed according to classifications which do not
without sufficient justification differentiate among covered employees solely 6n
the basis of sex."1 42 Although the legislature had articulated the benign compensatory purpose of providing women with benefits because of economic discrimination, the Court was willing to look to the statutory scheme and the legislative
history to determine if the purpose articulated by the Government was in reality
1 4
the genuine purpose of the provision.

1

It may be assumed that as a result of the gender-based classification and the
individual interest in not being stigmatized by an invidious classification, the
Court was willing to not only reject the Government's articulated purpose, but
also to substitute another purpose to the statutory provision. Even Justice Rehnquist, concurring in the result, was willing to take a hard look at the context and
138 Id. at 506; see id. at 518 (Brennan, 3., dissenting).
139 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
140 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
141 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 642-43 (1975).
142 Id. at 647.
143 Not only 'did the Court reject the Government's articulated purpose, it went further to
attribute to the provision the more general purposes of the Social Security Act of enabling the
surviving parent to remain at home to care for the child. Id. at 648-51.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[July 1976]

history of § 4 02 (g) and reject the Government's proffered.legislative purpose.14 4
The Court chose not to invalidate this sex-based classification by using the strict
scrutiny standard of a compelling state interest. Yet, "this intense examination
of legislative objectives and searching for unstated legislative purposes is a salient
characteristic of the strict scrutiny approach."'4 5 In having chosen not to employ
the language of strict scrutiny, the Court implicitly recognized a middle-standard
of equal protection which caused it to closely scrutinize the governmental purpose,
to require a close relationship between means and ends, and to demand a sufficient justification for the differentiation among employees on the sole basis of
sex.
Perhaps the recent case which is the most interesting and inconsistent with
the thesis of this article is Weinberger v. Salfi,"46
' said by one commentator to
sound the death knell for the irrebuttable presumption doctrine. 147 That case involved an attack on 42 U.S.C. § 416(c) (5) and (e) (2), the duration-of-relationship requirements of the Social Security Act which prohibit a wage earner's
widow or stepchild from receiving insurance benefits unless their relationships to
the wage earner existed nine months prior to death. In upholding the constitutionality of the provision, the Court simply recited the minimum rationality
standard, citing Dandridge v. Williams,4 ' Richardson v. Belcher,'49 and Flemming v. Nestor."' Both Jiminez v. Weinberger... and United States Dep't. of
Agriculture v. Murry s" were distinguished as involving classifications which bore
no rational relation to a legitimate legislative goal.' Although the Court tolerated
the underinclusive and overinclusive nature of the classification," 4 the majority
used language which could have required closer scrutiny than the minimum
rationality standard when it stated, "The benefits here are available upon compliance with an objective criterion, one which the Legislature considered to bear a
sufficiently close nexus with underlying policy objectives to be used as the test for
eligibility.""' If the Court was simply deferring to legislative analysis and determination, the integrity of the minimum rationality standard may be maintained.
However, if the Court independently scrutinized the statutory scheme to determine if the legislative means bore a "sufficiently close nexus" to the articulated
legislative ends, a standard other than minimum rationality was utilized. This
"sufficiently close nexus" test would require a higher level of scrutiny than would
minimum rationality.' 6 Perhaps the level of scrutiny employed was determined
144 Id. at 655 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the result).
145 Note, Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, The New, New Equal Protection, 72 MIcH. L.
Rav. 508, 531 (1974); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
146 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
147 Monaghan, Foreword: The Supreme Court 1974 Term, 89 H~Asv. L. REv. 1, n.2 (1975).
148 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
149 404 U.S. 78 (1971).
150 363 U.S. 603 (1960); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
151 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
152 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
153 Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 479 (1975). In both these cases, however, Mr. Justice
Rehnquist dissented, expressing the view that the classifications rested upon a rational basis.
154 Id. at 775.
155 Id. at 772.
156 Yet it is unclear what level of scrutiny was employed, for Justice Brennan, in dissent,
suggests that there was no evidence presented whatsoever that the problem of collusive marriages exists at all. Id. at 804.
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by an analysis of the individual interest affected as compared to the state interest,
thereby allowing the Court to require less precision than would Justice Brennan's
dissent, but more precision than that imposed by a minimum rationality
standard.'
VI. Conclusion
It has been suggested that equal protection claims in the area of social welfare legislation have been foreclosed by Dandridge v. Williams.'
However,
United States Dep't. of Agriculture v. MurrY' 59 and United States Dep't. of
Agriculture v. Moreno 6 ' indicate that there possibly is room to challenge welfare
regulations on a rationality basis that goes somewhat beyond earlier notions of
"minimum." When the legislative classification involves important individual
interests, including the interest in not being stigmatized by an invidious classification, which outweigh the state interests involved, the level of scrutiny will become more severe. As the individual interest becomes more important or as the
state interest becomes less important, the Court will become increasingly rigid in
its reliance on the articulatedgovernmental purpose and in. the requirement that
the statute be precisely drawn. It is the thesis of this article that in these situations
where an important individual interest is at stake, although not one which will in
itself trigger strict scrutiny, the Court will look to demonstrable evidence to determine the actual purpose of the statute and to ensure that the selected means will
in fact substantially further that purpose without a high degree of over- or underinclusion.

157 Compare Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), with United States Dep't of Agri.
v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (where the interest at stake was sufficient food for an adequate
diet); see The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 H.-mv. L. Rav. 47, 82-83 n.51 (1975).
158 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
159 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
160 413 U.S. 528 (1973).

